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ABSTRACT

Determinants of Residenti al Water Conservation: The Case of Salt Lake City, Utah
by
Eric A. Co leman, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2004
Major Professor: Dr. Terrence F. Glover
Departm ent: Economics
This study evaluates the effectiveness of demand-side water conservation polici es
in Sa lt Lake City, Utah for the years 1999 to 2002. We add to the existing residential
water demand literature by exploring panel estim ation techniques with di saggregated
household level data. Alternative policies used to induce water conservation are
di scussed based on estimates of demand schedule parameters. We find that public
conservation .campaigns have had negli gibl e impacts on the city's water use. There have
been, however, statistically significant reductions in consumption due to price changes
despite minimal price increases. Our findin gs should enable local and state policymakers
to better assess the tradeoffs of alternative conservation programs.
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I. BACKGROUND

The Utah Wasatch Front region has experienced periodic drought throughout its
history, and in every year since 1999 Utah 's annual rainfall has been below its thirty-year
average (UDWR 2002). These conditions, combined with rapid population growth, have
made water allocation an important policy debate in the region (UDWR 2003).
Traditionally, the state has addressed these needs with attempts at increasing water
suppl ies and improving infrastructure for delivery. Federal projects such as the Weber
Basin, Central Valley and Joes Va lley, and local projects subsidized by state agencies,
made continued exploration possible (UDWR 2002).
Recently, the municipal government of Salt Lake City has recogni zed the limits of
water exp loration and the impending need for increased conservation. The city started
experimenting with demand-side management policies in 1995 by commissioning a panel
to assess potential conservation from rate structure changes in its billing. In the city' s
2002 Summer Water Management Plan, there is mention of the need for a "more
aggressive water rate structure," and eventual change for pricing in the summer of2003
(SLC DPU 2002). However, residential and agricultural users have been particularly
hostile to those changes.
Alternative (non-price) demand-side management policies have been introduced
in many areas where price increases seem politically infeasible. In particu lar, Salt Lake
Ci ty has implemented moral suasion programs to encourage conservation as part of the
statewide public education water conservation campaign known as "Slow the flow, Save
H20" (SLC DPU 2002; UDWR 2002). This campaign includes mailings, television and
radio ads, and a webpage. The Utah Division of Water Resources (2002) asserts that

water use has decreased " . . in every water district studied, a probable result of the
campaign." In addition, water efficiency studies have been conducted for municipal
green spaces and the public information campaign has been augmented with
"demonstration gardens" within the city. Myriad other projects have also emerged,
including those for specific conservation targets involving large water users and
participation in the EPA Water Alliance for Voluntary Efficiency (WAVE) program
(SLC DPU 2002).
Burgeoning debate in Utah around inducing residential water conservation makes
this study especially salient to policymakers at the state and municipal level. Many Utah
cities have experimented recently with changing water rate structures, and many more
participate in the "Slow the Flow" information campaign. Because issues of water
shortage and rate increases now face citi zens statewide, there has been immense public
interest and much media attention to the issue. Salt Lake City is the state's largest city,
as well as one of its fastest growing cities, and is therefore especially important in the
policy debate.
This debate suggests that more information is needed on the forces that induce
water conservation. The purpose of this current study is to attempt to analyze the effects
of pricing strategies relative to moral suasion campaigns on water use within the Salt
Lake City area. A water use equation is estimated to identify the separate impacts of these
forces. Results from this paper add to information available to policymakers statewide
when deciding on conservation strategies.
We independently assess the magnitude of the state public information
campaign's effectiveness on Salt Lake City's water use patterns. Alternative water
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conservation strategies are then offered based on price elasticities measured from a
sample of residential water users. The wealth of household-specific time series data
provide a unique opportunity to model use responsiveness of individual households to
these various policy alternatives.
To our know ledge, this is the first water use study using panel data methods to
obtain estimates at the household level. In short, we find that increasing prices would be
significantly effective at reducing water consumption in summer months when most
discretionary water use takes place. In addition, there have been only negligible effects
on the city's water use from the statewide "Slow the Flow" public information campaign.
The next section reviews the literature in residential water demand . Section three
introduces the data and section four reviews the econometric models used to arrive at our
results. Section four reports empirical findings and section five concludes.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Howe and Linaweaver (1967) conducted one of the first aggregate studies of
residential water demand by comparing a cross-section of cities throughout the United
States. Using a simp le linear regression model, they found indoor water demand to be
relatively price inelastic. The authors also concluded that consumers react to average
prices instead of marginal prices, because few consumers know how to read water meters
accurately. Therefore, consumers are unaware of their water use vis-a-vis block rate
structures that induce differing marginal prices depending on consumption level.
Following this study, others in early water demand literature also used "ex post
calculated" average prices (Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989). Three problems arose with
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this early approach. First, conventional microeconomic theory posits agents making
decisions based on marginal rather than average prices. Second, prices are likely
correlated with the stochastic disturbance term in the single equation water demand
model, and are therefore endogenous. Third, aggregate cross sectional data is limited in
its ability to model individual consumer behavior. Water economists subsequently tried
compensating for each of these shortcomings. Each is addressed below.

Price Definition
Borrowing from concurrent research in utility markets, where similar block-rate
pricing exists, the specification of price variables has changed. In his study of the
electricity sector Taylor (1975) argued that marginal and average price should be used
together for estimates in markets under block pricing. Nordin (1976) later modified
Taylor's suggestion by requiring a "difference" variable instead of average price. The
Taylor-Nordin difference variable, or rate premium, is defined as the difference between
what consumers would pay had they been charged their ending marginal price all along,
and what they actually have to pay. The difference variable takes into account that
residential water users face intrarnarginal differences in price depending on their
consumption level. Because of inconsistent marginal prices under block-rate pricing,
consumer income deviates from what it would be if water were sold under constant
marginal prices (Dandy, Nguyen, and Davies 1997).
A simple example of Salt Lake City's billing structure helps to illustrate. The
city's tariff system uses a fixed allowance and a constant block rate as shown in Figure 1,
where average price is measured against water use. Up to the first W 1 (500 cubic feet)
units of water, consumers are charged a flat fee R 1 x W 1 • Note that a household

consuming beyond the first block at, say, W2 is being charged marginal rate R2 for all
water in excess ofW 1• The marginal price facing this consumer is R2 , so that the average
price per hundred cubic feet of water is falling. In a competitive market this consumer's
total expenditure for water would be the shaded portion of the graph (area R 2 x W 2).

w
W 1=500

W2

FIGURE I
lLLUSTRA TION OF TH E TA YLOR-NORDIN DIFFERENCE V ARJABLE

Due to the block-rate structure, however, the actual bill is the shaded area plus the
crosshatched area (R 1 - R 2 x W 1) in the above region. If the household had been charged
the marginal price of water for the entire bill, their bill would be lower. The crosshatched
area acts as an implicit use tax, and is therefore expected to be negatively related to water
use. It represents the so-called Taylor-Nordin difference.

Note that an increasing block

rate structure implies an implicit income subsidy (Renwick and Green 2000), and the
effect of income on water consumption should be equal in magnitude and opposite in sign
of the difference variable (Nieswiadomy 1992).
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The water demand literature has generally incorporated the Taylor-Nordin
specification for price variab les, but some studies have tried to empirically test whether
consumers react to marginal or average prices. Nieswiadomy (1992) used a "perceived
price," which is simply a combination of average and marginal prices first developed by
Shin (1985). Opaluch (1982) suggests using a new price variable, defined as the
difference between average and marginal prices, and develops a limited test for inference
of the appropriate variable. This specification was later used by Nauges and Thomas
(2000).
Water is typically assumed to be price inelastic, at least at low quantities of
consumption, but market demand curves for most functional forms are elastic in some
regions and inelastic in others. Therefore, any statement of price elasticity of water must
be qualified within a given price range. Disparate results emerge from the plethora of
water demand studies; however, based on a meta-analysis of forty-five studies that derive
price elasticity measures, Dalhuisen et al. (2003) concluded that residential water demand
is generally relatively price inelastic. Factors influencing that finding are functional form
of models, accuracy of information of block pricing, and inclusion of alternative price
specifications. Interestingly, the discrete-continuous choice model first used by Hewitt
and Hanemann ( 1995) consistently provides inelastic price estimates.
Brookshire et al. (2002) review a number of water demand studies focused
specifically on the western U.S., and question the validity of many elasticity measures.
They maintain that in communities where cost-based marginal prices are "far" from the
rates actually being charged, elasticity estimates may not be useful to policymakers,
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especially since this jeopardizes the applicability of such measures to price ranges outside
of the actual prices being studied.

Model Specification
The literature has generally led to the conclusion that under block rate pricing
there is bias in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of single equation water demand
models, because of the joint determination of water use and prices (Nieswiadomy and
Molina 1989; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Renzetti 2002). Water users respond to the
marginal price of water by consuming a given amount. The amount they consume also
determines the price of water if they face a block rate. The Taylor-Nordin difference
variable is also determined by consumption and must be solved simultaneously with the
other two variables. As mentioned by Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), water demand
models often compensate for this endogeneity by using instrumental variables under twoor three-stage least squares estimation techniques.
Dalhuisen et al. (2003) summarize common variables used in identifying
residential water demand. Economic variables, such as price (marginal, average, and the
difference variable) and income are commonly included, and are usually the primary
focus of all research. These measures are vital in exp laining how water markets work,
and nearly every study on water demand reports one or both.
Climatic variables are also commonly included. These variab les are assumed to
be exogenous and are often statistically significant. For example, seasonality affects
sprinkler use and lawn watering differences throughout the year. Soil type,
evapotranspiration, rainfall, and elevation may all contribute to changes in water use
(Hansen, Hughes, and Chiang 1994). Household variables commonly used include

income, income proxies, commercial/residential dummies, lot size, number of bathrooms,
and household density. All of these explanatory variables may be significant in defining
water demand.
A number of studies have also used alternative demand-side management policies
such as public information campaigns and conservation programs as explanatory
variables affecting water use (Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf 1999; Nieswiadomy
1992; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000). For example, Renwick
and Archibald (1998) look at the effects of the 1982-92 California droughts on 119
households in the communities of Goleta and Santa Barbara. The cities tried several
alternative demand-side management policies to curtail water use during and after the
drought. For instance, Santa Barbara restricted irrigation use and Goleta allocated water
quotas based on historic use and imposed stringent fee increases for quota violations.
Subsidies for low-flow toilets and showerheads, retrofitting, and public information
campaigns to inform citizens on water efficient irrigation technologies were also used in
the region. The authors conclude that each policy alternative had a statistically
significant effect on reduced water demand in the area.
Two years later, Renwick and Green (2000) extended the study to eight
aggregated California water districts. Their goal was to assess the relative effectiveness
of alternative policies in reducing water demand. They found that price responsiveness
varied seasonally, and that stringent mandatory non-price policies, such as quotas, were
more effective in reducing use than voluntary measures, such as rebates, retrofitting, and
public information campaigns. The authors conclude that modest decreases in water use
(5%-15%) can be achieved through price mechanisms or voluntary measures, but that
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significant reduction (> 15%) is best achieved through well -enforced rationing schemes.
Table I gives results from studies using public infonnation campaigns as explanatory
variables. It shows that moral suasion campaigns may be very effective at reducing
demand. However, these studies fail to analyze the long-term effects of campaigns and
the costs of implementation.

TABLE 1
STUDIES OF PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS

Study

Location

Michelsen, McGuckin and Stumpf(l999)

Los Angeles
San Diego
Denver
Broomfield
Albuquerque
Santa Fe
Las Cruces
Nieswiadomy (1992)
North Central U.S.
Northeast U.S.
Southern U.S.
Western U.S.
Renwick and Green (2000)
8 California cities
*significant at 5%; **significant at I%

Effect on Mean
Consumption (%)'
-I. I**

-2.7**
-2.0**
0.0
-2.0**
-4.0**
0.0
1.9
-4.24
17.6
-17.56*
-8.0**

Data
Danielson (1979) argues that using cross sectional data for demand analysis
requires the heroic assumption that the spatial effect of the explanatory variables equals
the temporal effect. Hanke (1970), Danielson (1979), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995), and
1

Effects from Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf( 1999) and Renwick and Green (2002) are taken from

the respective study. To e stimate the mean effect on consumption for Nieswiadomy ( 1992) we used

Kennedy 's ( 1981) teclmique:

%Effect = 100( exp(fJ where

f3

v;)) -1)

is the dummy variable regression coefficient for the public information campaign, and

the variance of

j3 .

V({J)

is
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Brookshire eta!. (2002) instead argue that data should ideally be collected from a number
of households over time in order to accurately measure consumer behavior.
Unfortunatel y, such data are difficult to obtai n. Many studies still use aggregated cross
secti onal data across states, communities, or regions because it is readily avail abl e
(Gaudin, Griffin, and Sickles 2001; Howe and Lin aweaver 1967; Michelsen, McGuckin,
and Stumpf 1999; Nieswiadomy 1992; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green
2000).
To exploi t the properties of combined cross sectional time seri es data (also known
as panel data), a number of estimation techniques have been developed. However, only a
few water demand studies have incorporated panel estimation. Although Gaudin et a!.
(200 I), Renwick and Green (2000), and Nauges and Thomas (2000) use such models for
residential water demand, they are limited by the use of aggregate data obtained at the
com munity level. Moeltner and Stoddard (2004) obtain panel estimates from a random
effects model at the firm level for commercial water use, but to our know ledge panel data
models for residential households have not been thoroughly explored.
Brookshire et a!. (2002) argue that disaggregate household data need to be
combined with adequate fluctu ations in price to accurately estimate a price elasticity
measure. Communities, however, do not dramatically change water prices over short
periods of time, making price elasticities immeasurabl e. Gathering household data over
lengthy time periods is also costly and time consuming.
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III. DATA

A complete database of Salt Lake Ci ty households' monthly water use during the
period from February 1999 to October 2002 was obtained from the Utah Division of
Water Resources. Water use from the billing period is converted to daily averages and
th en transformed to thirty-day averages in order to have conformable data between cross
sections. Quantity is reported in thirty-day averages of hundred cubic feet (H CF)
consumed. Marginal prices and the Taylor-Nordin difference variable were calculated
based upon the city-mandated price structure. They are adjusted for inflation (CPT base
year 2002) in price per hundred cubic feet of water. Although rates slightly increased
nominally from year to year over the study period (see Table 2), real winter rates
remained relatively constant, and in some years even decreased. Yearl y summer rates
had sli ghtl y more price variation from year to year.
The city 's billing structure is complex. The first determinant of the bill is the
connection size of the pipe for incoming water. Based upon that size, the city charges a
flat fee for the first 500 cubic feet of water co nsumed, and a lower average fee for each
I 00 cubic feel of water thereafter. Dwellings outside of city boundari es that are serviced

by Salt Lake City are charged an even hi gher marginal rate if consumption is beyond the
fi xed allowance. In this study, the total water bill is inferred from total usage, connection
size, location, and pricing determined by city ordinance. In instances where the billing
period is not thirty days the city extends the fl at-fee allowable amount in proportion to
the lag in measuring time. For example, a user with a one inch connection that is billed
45 days after the previous billing would be charged the "one inch flat fee" for the first
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. feet of water consumed and the appropnate
.
.
. for
500 x ( 45) = 750 cub1c
margmal
pnce
30
any water consumed in excess of that amount. Knowing the dates o f the readings has
all owed us to reconstruct the bill for each household despite the incon sistency in
measurement with respect to time.

Dates

TABLE2
WATER BILLING WITHIN SALT L AKE CITY
Meter Size
Nominal Marginal Rate
Fixed Fee
Season
3/4" & I"

Ju ly I, 1998 -

June, 30 1999

$ 18.38

2"

$27.51

2 112"

$75.00

3"

$55.07

4"

$84.91

3/4" & I"

Jul y I, 1999-

Jul y I, 2000-

Jul y I, 200 1 -

June, 30 2000

June, 30 200 1

June, 30 2002

$20. 10

2"

$29.96

2 112"

June, 30 2003

$59.73
$9 1.95

3/4" & I"
I 112"

$7.55
$2 1. 5 1

2"

$32.06
$63.9 1
$98.39

3/4" & I"
I 112"

$8.08
$23.02

2"

$34 .03

0.72

Winter

0.5 1

Summer

0.78

Winter

0.55

Summer

0.83

Winter

0.59

Sununer

0.89

Winter

0.61

Summer

0.93

$ 100.00

3"

$68.38

4"

$ 105.28
$8.40

I 112"

$23.94

2"

$35.67

2 112"

Summer

$ 100.00

3"
4"

2 112"

0.47

$ 100.00

3"
4"

2 112"

W inter

$7.06

I 112"

3/4" & I"

July I, 2002 -

$6.3 1

I 112"

$ 100.00

3"

$7 1.12

4"

$109.49
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The state public infonnation campaign started on October 31, 2001. ln the
regression analysis entries before this time are ass igned a 0 and after this time a I . This
does not, however, exactly represent a true estimate of public infonnation campaign
effectiveness. The Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District originally developed the
"S low the Flow, Save H20" campaign years earlier at a regional level throughout the Salt
Lake Valley. The state subsequently adopted this campaign based on its established
name recognition. Still, the dummy variable used in this study can be justified on the
presumption that once adopted at the state level, funding increased and it was better
publicized. Its coefficient in the econometric models is interpreted as the effect on
average water consumption once the campaign was adopted at the state level2
Building area, number of bathrooms, and lot size were obtained from the county
recorder's office by matching a parcel number for the dwelling also avail ab le to the water
utility. The income variable is a proxy obtained following Nieswiadomy and Molina 's
(1989) procedure, later used by Hewitt and Hanneman (1995). First, the taxable value of
the dwelling was retri eved from the county recorder' s office. Using the fact that banks
usually issue loans such that a monthly mortgage payment does not exceed one-third of a
borrower's income, and assumi ng a ten percent interest rate, it is approximated: lncome =
(Taxable Value)(0.10)(3/12). These va lues were then adjusted for inflation using the
CPI, and trended using the average annual growth rate of per capita income in Salt Lake
City for the years 1999-2002.

2

The dummy va riable approach to estimating the campaign is not ideal. It assumes that marketing strategy,

funding, and overall intensity of the campaign are the same in each month. Perhaps using a proxy for
intens ity, such as monthly expendin1re for the program, wou ld better model changes in the campaign over

time.
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TABLE3
VARIABLE DEFIN ITIONS

Variable

Name
Household-average thirty day

Description
HCF of water used by consumer i at timet

water use

w,

City-wide average monthly

Average water use for the entire c ity in every month, t,

water use

measured in HCF

MP

Marginal Price

Measured in 2002 dollars per HCF of water

D

Taylor-Nordin difference
variable (rate premium)

Implicit tax on consumers in 2002 dollars

I

Income proxy

Calculated monthly income in 2002 dollars

STF

"Slow the Flow" Public
information campaign dummy

~1

if the campaign in effect (2001-2002);

~o

otherwise (1999-2000)

PRECIP

Average dail y precipitation

As mea sured (inches) from nearest weather station

WETF

Fraction of wet days

Number of wet days divided by the total number of
days in billing cycle

Average maximum daily air

Deri ved from nearest weather station to the dwe lling

TEMP

temperature

ET

Evapotranspiration

Average daily E.T. using Blaney-Criddle specification

AREA

Building Area

Total area, in square feet, of the dwelling
Total number of bathrooms for the dwelling

BATH

Nu mber of Bathrooms

LOT

Lot size

Acres of the lot size of the dwelling

METER

Meter size

Size, in inches, of the connection size to the dwelling

APT

Apartment dummy

= 1 if dwelling is zoned as an aparnnent
=0 otherwise
= I if marginal rate in effect when water use was read
= 0 otherwise
= l if fixed fee in effect when water use was read
=0 otherwise

RATE

Rate dummy

FEE

Fixed fee dummy

Three weather stations are used to compute climate variables: the Salt Lake
Airport, Hogle Zoo, and Murray Golf Course. The dispersion of the stations fortunately
offers a range of accurate climate measurements across the valley. The Salt Lake Airport
is located on the west side of the valley at a relatively lower altitude than the others. The
Murray Go lf Course, on the other hand, is on the eastern side of the valley on the benches
of the Wasatch Mountain Range. Differences in elevation are then implicit in climatic
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measurement, especiall y precipitati on. The Hogle Zoo, located in the middle of
downtown Salt Lake City, provides additional moderation .
Us ing Geographic Inform ation System (GIS) software, dwellings are assigned to
the nearest weather station, and daily average readings of precipitation and temperature
are given to each household. Because readings are daily, each household 's climate
variab les perfectly match the days during the billing cycle. Evapotranspiration is then
measured using the Blaney-Criddle (1950) method, suitable for desert-like climates
similar to the Salt Lake Valley. Variable defi nitions are provided in Table 3.
The database originall y included approximately 3.5 million monthly observations
of consumer water use. Cross sections with missing values, incompl ete panels, and nonres idential water users were eliminated from the dataset. We follow Niesw iadomy and
Molina (1989) and simply eliminate those few households consuming less than 500 cubic
feet ofwater3• For reasons described below, the sample panel is then limited to summer
observations, and therefore consists of I 04 7 households for a total of eighteen months.
Summary stati stics for this sample are found in Tab le 4.

3

Rece nt work by Dandy, Nguye n, and Davies ( 1997) attempts to capture the effects of pricing wi th fixed

fees by dividing the sample into entries co nsuming within th e free allowance and those above. The authors
then separate observations into two models for pooled estimates. However, price vari ables are eliminated
from the model of those consuming less than the free allowance s ince all of those consumers face a zero
marg ina l price and zero difference variable. Estimates were re lativel y stable between the two mode ls for

the authors' other explanatory variables. Since this study focuses on the policy implications of pricing
instruments, and to avoid pane l data co mpli cations from s ingling out observations for households, we do
not es timate parameters of the model for those few househo ld s consuming within the free allowance.
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES D URING SUMMER MONTHS

Variable
Water use
Marginal Price
Taylor- Nordin Difference
Income Proxy
Slow the Flow
Precipitation
Fraction of wet days
Ave. Maximum. Temperature
Evapotranspiration
Building Area
Bathrooms
Lot Size
Meter Size
Arartment

Mean
Std. Dev.
30.66
42.54
0.85
0.15
4.05
1.41
3200.45
1502.35
0.33
0.47
0.026
0.02
0.15
0.08
85.7
6.35
5.58
1.04
2073.28
827.23
2.1
0.91
0.18
0.1
0.76
0.14
0.002
0.04

IV. MODEL SELECTION

Agthe et al. (1986) were the first to use a system of linear equations representing
water supply and demand "derived from an indirect utility approach to investigate the
behavior of consumers facing a nonlinear budget set." The authors constructed suppl y
functions to compensate for the endogeneity of marginal price and the difference
variable. These equations included variables that shift or otherwise change the rate
structure. We follow this approach, but adapt the model to household specific data. This
reduces the supply equations to sets of instrumental variables as explained below. First,
arranging the data by stacking all time observations for each household we form the
following equations from the even panel of sample data4 :

'The average price specification was not used after preliminary statistics revealed that in Salt Lake City
average price would be negatively correlated with water use a priori. As shown in Fig ure I increased
water use implie s sma ller average price merely because of the rate structure.
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[I]

[2]
[3]

i = I,.. .,N

t=I, ... ,T

(N = 1047)

(T = 44)

The unobservable household specific disturbance for each equation is represented
by c, , discussed in more detail below. The idiosyncratic disturbance term for each
equation is e,,, and is transformed to correct for a first-order autoregressi ve disturbance
process, AR( 1). The predicted marginal price (MP,,) and difference ( D,,) variables for
household i in time period t, are obtained by the reduced form supply eq uations [2] and
[3]. The explanatory vari ab les in these two equati ons consist of a series of dummy or
shift variab les taken from changes in the rate structure and monthly averages of
municipality-wide water consumption. During the forty-four month period, the marginal
pricing structure was changed a total of nine times, and thereforez:,IP contains eight
dummy variabl es indicating when a particul ar rate stmcture was in effect. The flat
allowance fee during the sample period changed five times; thus, since the difference
variable is affected by both fl at fee changes and marginal pricing, z,~ contains a total of
twelve dummy vari ables. In addition, city-wide average monthly water consumption is
included in both equations to represent the quantity of water available, on average, to
each consumer given the current rate structure. Assuming that a single household's
ab ility to change average water consumption for the entire city is negligible, all right
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hand side variables in [2] and [3] are exogenous to the system. Therefore, the supply
equations simply reduce to a set of instruments for the marginal price and difference
variab le. In addition, the exogenous variab les X,, in the water use equation [I] are a
matri x of climate, policy, and househo ld variables. In short:

x il

=[ In I , ,STF, , In AREA, , In LOT, , APT, , In BATH, ,PRECIP,,, WETF,, , In TEMP,,

·J

In ET,,, In METER,

z:,tP = (Rate2, Rate3, Rate4, RateS, Rate6, Rate7, Rate8, Rate9, w, )
z,? = (Rate2, Rate3, Rate4, RateS, Rate6, Rate? , RateS, Rate9, w, Fee2, Fee3, Fee4, FeeS)
Refer aga in to Table 4 fo r variable definitions. The structural parameters for this model

Pooled Ordinmy Least Squares
We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) as a starting point because of its
convenience in estimation. However, using pooled OLSon equation [I] requires some
very restrictive assumptions. We must assume that household specific effects do not
ex ist, and that each observation can be treated as strictly independent of all others. First,
we assume the existence ofu,, = c, + e,,, a composite error term, where u is iid.
Assum ing zero covariance between

c,and e,, , thi s allows us to write equation [I] as:

ln w,, = alnMP,, +fJlnD,, +X,,y+ u,;

[4]
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Individual househo ld effect s,

c,, may be subsumed in the idiosyncratic error terrn

u,;·, implying zero correlation between the variables on the right hand side of eq uation [I]
and the household speci fi e effects (Woo ldri dge, 2002):

E(c,"'l lnMP,, , lnD,,X,, )= 0

(5]

Similarly, OLS assumes that marginal price and the difference variable, along with all
other explanatory variables, are strictly exogenous:

[6]

Final ly, we impose a constant variance restriction on the error terrn:

E(u ,; )= a-,;
Now we define matrix A = ( In MP

(7]

In D

X) and parameter vector

o = (a (J y) , where MP, D, and X are vector representations of lnMP,,

InD,,,and

X,, respectively. OLS estimates from the pooled data given byaoLs = (A' At' A'(ln w)
will be unbiased and efficient under the prior assumptions.

Pooled OLS with Instrumental Variables
We now consider that under block rate pricing the marginal price,MP,,, and the
Taylor-Nordin difference variable , D,,, may be endogenous. We thus relax the
assumption [6] that all variables in A are strictly exogenous. Following Greene (2003 ,
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pg. 78) an instrumental variable (IV) technique is used. We write the projection of In MP
on the exogenous variables from [2) as:

[8)

lnMP = Z "P( Z "P 'Z"Pr' Z "P '(lnMP)

and the projection of In Don the exogenous variables from [3) as:

[9)

We next define matrix B =(In

as~ ,v

MP

In D

X)and write the pooled IV estimates

= (B'B t' B'(ln w).

Fixed Effects
Pooled estimates of the data do not account for heterogeneity across households,
whi ch may be important in explaining consumer water use behavior. To account for
these ho usehold specific effects, we now relax assumption [5) , and acknowledge that
some variables for all equations may be correlated with c, . The dummy vari ab le c, is
simp ly used to distinguish households, and represents unobservable household
characteristics 5 . However, with a large cross section of households (in our case 1047) the
dummy vari abl e approach to defining this heterogeneity quickly becomes impracti cal.
Standard fixed effects models (also called "within" estimates) "remove" thi s household
effect by transforming the panel data through first differencing or deviating individual

5

Suc h charac teristics in our model may include a household 's relative degree of exposure to the public
information ca mpaign , sense of community, desire to conserve water, desire for a healthy lawn, etc.
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observations from household means. Si nce c, is time invariant, either method eliminates
it and all other time invari ant variab les from the water use equation. Est imates after this
transfonnation are consistent after rel ax ing assumption [5). We foll ow the latter
approach and in so doing redefine [ 1]-[3] as:

[10]

(In MPIf - Ifl MP)=
I

(z 'fP - z"P yr
\_ up+ ( MP - ---,;p )
11

II

ell

e,

[II]
[12]

where In w, , In MP;

, etc.

represent the respective mean values for each individual i, with

respect to time. To simplify notation, we define a new set of equations:

[13]
[14]

[15]

where In

w, = (In w, -In w,), In MP,, = (In MP;, - In MP; ), etc., or deviations from

household means.
Similar to the instrumental vari able procedure defined earlier, we define
proj ections from In D and In MP for the fixed effects model:

[16]

[17]
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Now define matri x F = ( In

MP

In D

X)and so lve for the fi xed effects

esti m ators~·· = (F'Ft' F'(ln w) . These results are unbiased and consistent under the
assumption that at least some of the variables in Fare correlated with the household
effects (Wooldridge 2002).

Random Effects (Generalized Least Squares)

Random effects estimates have the benefit of providing estimates for all
explanatory variables, including those dropped in the fixed effects model. However, it
again requires the restrictive assumption that household heterogeneity is not ex pressed in
the household specific dummy variable. The procedure involves using generalized least
squares (GLS) on the data sample, with a variance-covariance matrix defined below.
First, we re-impose restriction [5] that individual specific effects are uncorrelated with
right hand side variables, where c; is again subsumed in the error term u;, . Following
Wooldridge (2002, pg. 259), we relax assumption [7], but retain assumptions (5] and (6] ,
and adopt:

*s

[18]

)=Var(u;,} =O"; + O"; =O",;

(19]

E(u;, u;,
E(u;,

2

)= O":,

Vt

(20]

where the within-group disturbances, !.1 , are defined as:
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cr: + cr:
cr'
!! = E(u ,u,') =
·~
[
cr;

[21]

and for the entire sample, the complete covariance matrix is:

V·[I

0

...

n

...

0

...

iJ·I,®fl

[22]

where I N is an N x N identity matrix.
Generalized least squares (GLS) regression requires adjusting equation [4) using
the variance structure presented in [21] and [22]. This is done by pre-multiplying both
sides of the equation by n-112 . Thus, when transfonning all three equ ations we have:

[23]
[24)
[25]

or, by Hausman and Taylor (1981 ):

(In w,,

- (1 -

B) In w,) = (tn MP,, - (1 - B) in MP, }x + (tn D,, - (1- B) In D, )p +

(tn D,, - (I - B)lnD,

(x,;- (1 - B) X,:' )r + k- (1 - B)~)
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[

)=(x,~- (1 - B)X,7 ~ 0 + k- (1 - B)e,

0

)

)

[28)
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where :

e
Again for simp li city, we define these equations as:

[29]
[30]

[31]
where

w= (In w,, - (1- B) ln w,), MP = (In MP,,- (1 [n

order to make the transformation

a-; must be estimated.

B)lnMP, ), etc.

e must be solved, implying that both a-; and

Consistent estimates of

a-;are taken from the fixed effects model

previously estimated (Wooldridge 2002). To obtain a consistent estimate of

a-; consider

the "between effects" model:

ln w,

=lnMP,a + 1nDJ3 + X,wr + c,w+e,w

[32]
[33]

[34]

When using between effects strictly time variant variables (i.e. do not vary between cross
sections) are dropped from the estimation . The "Slow the Flow" campaign dummy
variable, STF, and the instrumental variab le average city-wide water use, W, , are dropped
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because of their time dependent nature. We define G =( In

M~,

In D ,

~'), so that

regression coefficients for the between model are obtained by ~·· = (G'G t' G'(ln w ,).

From thi s

a-;£ is obtained. Using the relationship, a-; = a-~£ - ~a-; , all the requisite

infonnation to generate

e is now present (Hausman and Taylor 1981).

This

transformation implies that random effects estimators are merely a weighted average of
between and fixed effects (Hausman and Taylor 1981).
After obtaining an estimate for B and transforming the data, random effects
estimates are calculated. Again using the first stage projections, we define a matrix
R =( In

kiP

In

D X). The random effects estimates become, ~·· = (R'Rt' R'(ln w).

Although we gain the estimated coe ffi cients on time invariant variables, random effects
w ill onl y be consistent if assumption [5] hold s.

V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Initiall y, estimates were generated from the previous four models for the entire
sampl e of water users over the whole time period. It was found from these estim ates that
the marginal price and difference variab le were indeed endogenous in water use equation
[I t

6

Surprisingly, marginal price coefficients for the models were positive. After further

The theoretica l linkage between marginal prices and the difference variabl e has already been discussed.
To empirica lly test the assumption of endogeneity, a Hausman (1978) spec ification test was performed on
the fixed e ffects modeL The test statistic has a chi-square di stribution with degrees of freedo m equi va lent
to the number of explanatory variables (in th is case eig ht). It is defined as

26
investi gation of the rate structure, thi s result is explained by the invariance of real
marginal pricing in wi nter months, and steep increases in pricing during the summer.
Average summer marginal rates, after adjusti ng for infl ation, were $0.85 per HCF of
water. During the winter the average rate was $0.58 per HCF, and that rate stayed
relatively constant across years. Coinciding with rate increases was a dramatic change in
water use, from an average of 14.3 HCF of water per household per month in the winter,
to 42.54 HCF during the summer. Thus, positive marginal prices were hypothesi zed to
be due to collinearity associated with a summer dummy variable.
To test if intercept or slope coefficients changed during summer months, we used
a dummy variable indicating summer months and an interaction variable between the
summer dummy and marginal prices, following Kmenta (1997, pg.469). We found that
there was a statistically significant positive change in intercept during summer months,
and a statistically significant negative change in marginal price slope. This follows
intuition, as the positive increase in intercept refl ects a general outward shift in water use
during months when there is greater water use. The negative slope change reflects
increased elasticity of water demand in summer months when water use is more
di scretionary in Salt Lake City. lf we assume, as Danielson (1979), that winter demand
represents strict ly "in-house" demand , then almost two-thirds of summer water use is for
outdoor purposes. Since outdoor use is arguably more discretionary than indoor use, we
where, 0 is the difference between estimates using the instrumental variables and those without them, so
that :

0 = 5;;

- &~~s.

The terms, V :/, V ~'fs are va ri ance-covariance matrices from the related

estimation technique. The null hypothesis is that regression parameters are equivalent under the two
models. Under the null hypothesis OLS estimates are considered consistent and efficient, but inconsistent
under the alternati ve. IV estimates are consistent under both the null and the alternative, but ineffici ent
under the null (Nieswiadomy and Molina t 989). For o ur data, the resulting statistic is
= 193. 1which
greatly exceeds the chi-square critical value of 20.09 at the one percent significance level. We thus
conclude that the marginal price and difference variab les are endogenous, and proceed with the two-stage
estimation technique.

nt
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TABLE 5
PANEL ESTIMATIONS OF INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES'

w,
Rate2
Rate3
Rate4
RateS
Rate6

Fixed Effects
lnMP
In D
0.003
-0.009

Random Effects
In D
lnMP
0.003
-0.0 1

( 136.43)**
0.302
(477.05)**
-0.089
(- 134.37)**
0.322
(563.31 )**
-0.041
(-60.84)**
0.368
(659.56)**

( 141.30)**
0.304
(527.61)**
-0 089
(-14 1. 58)**
0.324
(596.47)**
-0.041
(-64.30)**
0.369
(697.70)**

Rate7
RateS

0.41
(756.57)**

Fee2
Fee3
FeeS
Constant
R-Squared
Number of
Observations

-0.582
(-717.33)**
0.99
17799

(- 7 1.58)**

0.19
(64. 15)**
0.099
(39.41)**
0.219
(47.23)**
0.1 76
(55. 11)**
0.334
(72.82) ..
0.25 1
(58.24)**
0.095
(32.58)**
0.069
(33.50)**
-0.09 1
(-35.23)**
1.287
( 179.90)**
0 .80
17799

0.411
(799.6 1)**

-0.58
(-213.0 1)**
0.79
18846

(-70.62)**

0.171
(58.27)**
-0.101
(-32.79)**
0.025
(4.51)**
-0.197
(-40.71)**
-0.032
(-5.06)**
-0.293
(-41.70)**
-0.249
(53.90)**
-0. 103
(-40.81)**
0.08 1
(25.66)**
2.013
(176.80)**
0.39
18846

t-statistics in parentheses

* significant at 5% level; ** significant at

I% level

wou ld expect summer months' price elastic ity to be greater (in absolute terms) than
winter.
Using the motivation that prices do not vary in winter months, we limit the dataset
to include just those summer months for which average city-wide water use was above 25
HCF (i.e. the months of June, July, August, and September). First stage estimates of the

7
When eliminating winter months the first and last marginal rate structures, Rate ! and Rate9, were not in
effect for any sununer month in the sample, nor was fi xed Fee l.
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instrumental variab le coefficients for the fi xed effects and random effect s models are
provided in Table 5, and estimates for water use are provided in Table 6. Estimation
results indicate good model perfonnance. Vari ab le coefficients are relatively stab le
across random and fixed effects mode ls indi cating robust estimates.
The first stage regressions produce hi gh goodness of lit measures, essential in order to
achi eve good instruments (Renwick and Green 2000). The R-Squared value for the fixed
and random effects water use models are 0. 78 and 0.46, respectivel y, and are well within
the range of previous studies. In both water use models all variabl es have the expected
signs and are stati sti cally significant. A Hausman (1978) specification test provides
strong evidence for using the estimates of the fixed effects model8 Intuitively, the key
consideration in deciding whether a random or fi xed effects model is most appropriate
depends on whether the explanatory variab les are uncorrelated with indi vidual effects
(Woo ldridge 2002). Our conclusion impli es that unobservable effects due to fixed
household specifi c heterogen eity are an important element in measuring water use.
Evapotranspiration, the approximate rate at which water evaporates, is positi vely
associated with water use. This presumabl y refl ects the high proportion of outdoor water
use in summer months. Consistent estimates from the fixed effects model indicate that a
I 0 percent increase in the rate of evapotranspiration would result in consumers using 3.6
percent more water. Average maximum dai ly air temperature elasticity is stati stically
8

This requires another Hausma n specification test of a slightly different form :

where

0 = &~;

- a:; 'and v ;;£' v /~£are the fixed effects and random effects covariance matrice s.

Fixed effects estimates are cons istent when household effects are correlated w ith the explanatory variables ,

but random effects are not. A statisticall y significant d ifference between the two estimates is considered
evidence against the random effects model (Wooldridge 2002). The chi-squared test statistic with eight
degrees of freedom is 5987.2 1 which exceeds the critica l va lue of20.09 at a one percent significance leve l.
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TABLE6
PAN EL EST IMATIONS OF WATER USE
Fixed Effec ts
Random Effects
ln w
lnw
lnMP
-0.407
-0.366
(- 16.90)**
( -9.45)**
lnD
- l.l91
-0.732
(- 11.69)**
(-13.10)**
ln I
0.411
0.426
( 14.40)**
(9.57)**
STF
-0.007
-0.053
(-0.95)
(-7.21)**
lnET
0.357
0.3 19
(6.7 1)**
(9.12)**
PRECIP
-1.37
-1.241
(- 11.28)**
(-10. 17)**
ln TEMP
0.233
1.255
(3.22)**
(25.42)**
WETF
-0.099
-0.19 1
(-3.24)**
(-6.36)**
APT
-0. 19
(-0.72)
In BATH
0.126
(3.33)**
ln AREA
-0.054
(-0.98)
ln LOT
0.49
(13.8 1)**
In METER
0.264
(338)**
Constant
-0.112
-3.638
(-4.59)**
(-8.84)**
R-Squared
0.78
0.46
Number of
Observations
17799
18846
t-statistics in parentheses
* significa nt at 5% leve l; ** signifi ca nt at I% leve l

signifi cant at 0.23 , which also intuitively reflects th e di scretionary use of outdoor water.
The elasticity of precipitation, calculated at the mean, is -0.04. This implies that if
monthly precipitation increases by I 0 percent, average household water use would
decrease by 0.4 percent. The fraction of wet days during a month also mildly affects
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consumption . Unfortunately, since random effects estim ates are inconsistent, coefficien ts
for variables representing time invariant household characteristics remain ambiguous9

V . CONCLUSION

From the preceding estimations we find that marginal price and the Taylor-Nordin
difference variable are endogenous to the water use equation. Because unobservabl e
household effects are correlated with the exogeno us variables, fixed effects estim ates
using an IV procedure to correct for price endogeneity generates the appropriate
estimators for this model.
A number of important findin gs can be gleaned from these results. First, the
hypothesis that the influence of the difference variable is equal in magnitude and opposite
in sign of the income effect is rejected at a one percent level ofsignificance 10 Other
studi es have had simi lar findings in thi s respect. Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989)
explain the deviation from theory may be due to the surrogate nature of the income
variable, the fact that the difference is such a small fraction of income, or because of
consumers ' lack of information on complicated rate structures.
Our estimation techniques provide unique insight to evaluate the effects of public
information campaigns and other public poli cies on Salt Lake City households' water use
patterns. The elasticity of marginal price is approximately -0.4 for both models, which is
within the range of measurement from previous studies (Dalhuisen et al. 2003), especially
9

Nauges and Thomas (2000) outline ga ins in efficiency and the potential to recover estimates of the time
invariant variables for the fixed effects model by using instrumental variable techniques (see Hausman and

Taylor, 198 1 and Amemiya and MaCurdy, 1986). Despite this, variables exogenous to c1 , needed for that
estimation, were not avai lable. Climate variab les largely depend on house locatio n and are therefore

specific to the household.

°For the fixed effects model, the test statistic for the null hypothesis that

1

8 1 + fJ = 0 is 10.76, and is

rejected on a 99 percent confidence interva l assu ming a normal z distribution.
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when compared to previous research on water demand in the western Un ited States
(Brook shire et al. 2002).
Elasti city measures are limited by the assumed Jog-linear functional form of our
model , and must be interpreted with caution. The assumption that price elasticity is
constant in any price range is probably umealistic (Gaudin, Griffin, and Sickles 2001).
This makes predictions outside of prices within the dataset umeliable (Brookshire et al.
2002). Nevertheless, the estimates obtained may provide significant insight into the
relative effectiveness of public policies on households ' behavior over the time being
studied. However, econometric estimates of winter marginal price elasticity cannot be
generated because there is virtually no price variation within our dataset during those
months.
The public information campaign dummy coefficient is insignificant in the more
appropriate fi xed effects model. Despite Nieswiadomy' s (1992) findin g that public
information campaigns are extremely potent in the West, this does not appear to be the
case in Salt Lake City. In comparison with other areas (see Table I), the "Slow the Flow"
campaign has had negligible impact on water consumption. Costs of implementing the
information campaign are beyond the scope of thi s paper, but any positive cost would
indicate a failure of cost-benefit criterion given the zero effect evident in the econometric
analysis of thi s study.
One caution in interpreting the effect of the public information campaign needs to
be noted, however. The measure of the influence of the campaign on water use is simply
whether the campaign is in existence (the dummy variable thereby taking on a value of I)
or not (the dumm y variable thereby being 0). We were unable to obtain data that would
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indicate the intensity of the campaign, particularly as the campaign was implemented in
the Salt Lake City area. It is still an open question as to whether the intensity of the
imp lementati on of such campaigns affects conservation behavior. We also only measure
the existence of the campaign for certain time periods within the Salt Lake area. The
effect of such campaigns may be quite different when implemented in other areas.
Certainl y more study of the effects of these types of strategies on water conservation is
needed.
The dominant results of this study, however, do indicate that price changes have
been more effective at achieving water conservation than the public information
campai gn. Mean household consumption in Salt Lake City during summers before the
campaign was 43.75 HCF of water per month and 40.12 HCF afterward, for a decrease in
average consumption of8.3 percent. The average marginal price of water for summers
before the campaign was $0.83, and after the campaign was $0.89, or an increase of 6.74
percent. Based on a marginal price elasticity of -0.4, mean consumption decreased by 2. 7
percent as a result of the increases in rate pricing. The negative coefficient of the
difference variable implies that fixed fee changes have had an even more pronounced
effect on water consumption.
Recently, Salt Lake City implemented a more aggressive rate structure to take
advantage of potential conservation from consumer reaction to price change. In June
2003 the city changed the existing billing structure in three ways: (I) it extended summer
pricing to the months of April, May, and October; (2) eliminated the 500 cubic foot
allowance; and (3) instituted an increasing block rate (3 blocks) system of marginal
pricing (SLC DPU 2004). Real marginal prices within the blocks are significantly hi gher
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than in previous years. This poli cy change seems especiall y promising because hi storica l
rates, even in summer month s, have not increased substantially. These changes wi ll
likely result in more residenti al conservation than simple reli ance on the statewide public
information campaign.
In 200 1, the Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water Resources,
formally publi shed a conservation goal of reduci ng municipal and industrial water use
throughout the state by twenty-five percent before 2050 (UDWR 2003). To achieve that
goal, reductions were to be reali zed through public information and the instillation of
more water efficient technologies (UDWR 2003). This study suggests that in Salt Lake
City, the state 's largest city, changes in price can be effective at achi eving conservation,
and may provide incentives for the adoption of more effi cient technology in water
distribution and use.
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